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Abstract 
David McNicol, in “Post-Milestone B Funding Climate and Cost Growth in Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs,” in Proceedings of the 14th Annual Acquisition Research 
Symposium, Vol. 1, explored the association between Program Acquisition Unit Cost 
(PAUC) growth of Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and funding climates post-
Milestone (MS) B. A strong positive association was found for MDAPs that passed MS B in a 
bust funding climate; the association was weak for programs that passed MS B in boom 
climates. This paper uses four alternative regression equations to extend these results. In 
each case, the same pattern of results appears—MDAPs that passed MS B in a bust climate 
had significantly higher growth than those that passed MS B in a boom climate, the 1969 
Packard reforms reduced average PAUC growth, and the reduction persisted through the 
end of the study (FY 2009)—but changes to the acquisition process after the Packard 
reforms through 2009 did not further reduce average PAUC growth. The lower PAUC growth 
after the Packard reforms probably was due mainly to more realistic MS B baselines. This 
pattern does not depend on the inclusion of post-MS B funding climate and program 
duration, although those factors have significant effects. 
Introduction1 
McNicol (2017b) explored the association between growth in the unit costs of Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and the funding climates programs experienced 
after passing Milestone (MS) B.2 While this topic arose by serendipity, a little reflection 
establishes that it is plausible to expect average cost growth to be higher for MDAPs that 
entered a boom climate sometime after passing MS B than it is for those that did not. 
MDAPs that passed MS B in bust climates probably are especially influenced by a post-MS 
                                            
 
 
1 This paper draws on Chapters 2 and, especially, 3 of McNicol (2018), which is a synthesis of a 
series of papers on the association of funding climate, acquisition policy, and other factors on cost 
growth of major acquisition programs. 
2 While the label MS B is used here for all time periods, through the years there have been changes 
in the labels used for milestones and, to some extent, in their definitions. During FY 1966–1969, there 
were two milestones in the OSD-level acquisition process, neither of which had a name. Reforms 
instituted early in FY 1970 provided for three milestones, labeled MS I, MS II, and MS III. In 1987, MS 
IV and MS V were added. By 1991, MS IV had been eliminated and what had been MS V became 
MS IV. MS IV had been eliminated by 1996. In 2000, the milestones were changed to MS A, MS B, 
and MS C, and the definition of MS B modestly changed. See McNicol (2018), Chapter 5. 
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B boom. Some of these programs presumably had unrealistic baselines and would find a 
post-MS B boom climate a good time to “get well.” Even programs that established realistic 
baselines at MS B might tend to be less capable than the service wanted and good 
candidates for adding capability when funding constraints were relaxed.  
A strong positive association was found between MDAPs that passed MS B in a bust 
funding climate and subsequently entered a boom funding climate. The association was 
much weaker for programs that passed MS B in boom climates. This paper uses a series of 
four models to extend those results by incorporating acquisition policy variables and 
program duration. The section titled Cost Growth Due to Program Changes also briefly 
examines the extent to which PAUC growth post-MS B reflects costs due to subsequent 
decisions to acquire capabilities beyond those of the MS B baseline. 
The Models 
The first of the models (Model 1) relates cost growth only to funding climate and 
acquisition policy configuration.3 Next (Model 2), post-MS B funding climate is introduced 
into the model. Two models (Models 3 and 4) that in different ways include both post-MS B 
funding climate and program duration are then presented. We begin by pointing to important 
features common to the four models. 
Framework of the Models 
The topic requires distinguishing between bust and boom funding climates. During 
the 45 years (fiscal year [FY] 1965–FY 2009) covered by this study, there were two 
complete bust-boom cycles in Department of Defense (DoD) procurement funding: (1) the 
bust climate for modernization of weapon systems that began in the mid-1960s and lasted 
until the Carter-Reagan buildup of the early to mid-1980s, and (2) the long post-Cold War 
bust climate followed by the post-9/11 boom.  
Where a bust funding climate may provide an upward pull on cost growth, acquisition 
policy and process can be expected to provide a restraining push. For that reason, it is 
necessary also to recognize changes over time in acquisition policy and process 
configurations. Five policy and process configurations are distinguished: 
1. McNamara-Clifford (FY 1964–FY 1969) 
2. Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC; FY 1970–FY 
1982) 
3. Post-Carlucci DSARC (P-C DSARC; FY 1983–FY 1989) 
4. Defense Acquisition Board (DAB; FY 1990–FY 1993 and FY 2001–FY 
2009) 
5. Acquisition Reform (AR; FY 1994–FY 2000) 
Policy and process tend to be intertwined; process typically is required to implement 
policy, and the most successful and durable policies are those embedded in process. For 
this reason, and to avoid constant repetition of “process and policy,” the term acquisition 
policy is used here in a broad sense to encompass both policy on particular topics (for 
                                            
 
 
3 The most developed explanations of funding climate and acquisition policy configuration are 
provided in McNicol (2018), Chapter 1. 
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example, contract types) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-level oversight 
process (for example, definition of the milestones).  
Finally, a measure of cost growth is required. The measure used is based on 
Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC). PAUC is the sum of Research, Development, Test 
and Evaluation cost and procurement cost, divided by the number of units acquired. For this 
paper, PAUC growth is computed by comparing the MS B baseline value of PAUC in 
program base-year dollars—which can be thought of as a goal or a prediction—to the actual 
PAUC reported in the program’s last Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) in program base-
year dollars and adjusted to the MS B baseline quantity. Appendix B of McNicol (2017a) 
describes the conventions used in assembling the database, the sources of the data used, 
and the quantity adjustment computations. The unit cost growth estimates were updated to 
the December 2015 SARs. Only completed programs (defined as programs with an end 
date of FY 2016 or earlier) are used in this analysis because some costs associated with a 
program may not be fully reflected in its SAR until the program is completed.  
To be clear, in what follows, the term PAUC growth means PAUC growth as defined 
previously, that is, growth from MS B through the end of procurement, adjusted to the MS B 
quantity. 
Model 1—The Baseline Model 
The “baseline model” is the following assumed relationship: 
PAUCi = a0 + a1Climatei + a2DSARCi + a3P-CDSARCi + a4DABi + a5ARi + ei  (1) 
The subscript i denotes the ith MDAP in the sample. This model provides a baseline 
in that it includes as independent variables only funding climate and acquisition policy 
configuration. 
Climate is a categorical variable4; it takes on a value of zero for MDAPs that passed 
MS B in bust climates and 1 for those that passed in boom climates. The intercept term a0 is 
assumed to measure primarily the climate effect.5 For programs that passed MS B in a bust 
climate, a0 is the intercept; for those that passed in a boom climate, the intercept is a0 + a1. 
The expectation is that the estimate of a1 is negative; that is, that MDAPs that passed MS B 
in a boom climate on average have lower PAUC growth. 
The model includes a categorical variable for each of the four acquisition policy 
configurations. These variables have a value of 1 for the years of the period in question 
(e.g., FY 1994–FY 2000 for AR), and zero for other years. For technical reasons, one of a 
set of categorical variables always must be omitted (or the constant term constrained to 
zero). The selection of the omitted variable is arbitrary insofar as the statistics are 
concerned; the McNamara-Clifford period was chosen because that is convenient for the 
exposition. The estimated coefficient of each of the acquisition policy categorical variables is 
the difference between average PAUC growth in that bin and average PAUC growth in 
                                            
 
 
4 These are often referred to as “dummy variables” but are more descriptively called categorical 
variables or indicator variables. 
5 The estimated coefficient of Climate also includes the average net effect of any relevant variables 
not included in this model and the effect on the estimated intercept of any non-linearity in the 
response of PAUC growth to the model’s explanatory variables. 
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McNamara-Clifford. That difference is statistically significant if the estimated coefficient of 
the acquisition policy period categorical variable is statistically significant.6 
Finally, the error term ei represents myriad unpredictable factors that influence PAUC 
growth; it is assumed to be a normally distributed random variable with a mean of zero and 
constant variance. The coefficients of the model are estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS; also known as multiple regression, linear regression, and least squares regression).7 
The results are presented in Table 1. We use the p-value to characterize statistical 
significance and refer to any estimate with a p-value of no more than 0.10 as “statistically 
significant.” A p-value of 0.10 means that there is an (estimated) one chance in 10 that the 
observed estimate would occur by chance even if the true value of the coefficient were zero.  
                                            
 
 
6 Note that for all of the observations of the McNamara-Clifford period, PAUCj = a0 + ej, and since it is 
assumed that E(ej) = 0, E(PAUCj) = a0. If the underlying model is correct and the assumptions of OLS 
are satisfied, the estimated value of the intercept (denoted a0))" is an unbiased estimate of a0 and of 
the sample value of the average PAUC growth of the McNamara-Clifford period. Similarly, the 
expected value of the intercept and the average PAUC growth for the ith acquisition policy bin is "a0 + 
ai," and the difference between that and the average for the reference group is a0 - (a0 + ai) = -ai . 
Hence, if ai is statistically significantly different from zero, the average PAUC growth for acquisition 
policy configuration i is significantly different from average PAUC growth for McNamara-Clifford. The 
burden of the assumptions is lightened by the fact that, in this context, “just about” counts. For 
example, no great harm is done if E(ej) is small rather than zero. 
7 Readers unfamiliar with this technique can find an explanation in any introductory econometrics text, 
in many introductory statistics texts, or on the internet. For example, TIBC Statistica, 
http://www.statsoft.com/Textbook/Multiple-Regression; Penn State Eberly College of Science, STAT 
501: Regression Methods, https://onlinecourses.science.psu.edu/stat501/node/283; John H. 
McDonald, Handbook of Biological Statistics, 
http://www.biostathandbook.com/multipleregression.html; and David M. Lane, “Introduction to Multiple 
Regression,” Chapter 14, in Online Statistics Education: An Interactive Multimedia Course of Study, 
http://onlinestatbook.com/2/regression/multiple_regression.html.  
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Table 1. Estimated Parameters of the Basic Model of PAUC Growth 
 
The dataset used to estimate the model in Table 1 omits four extremely long duration 
programs. Each of these “programs” is actually a series of modifications and upgrades of an 
initial program reported on the SAR of the original program. Also excluded are three 
programs from the early 1980s boom period that were acquired using variants of Total 
Package Procurement (TPP). These observations were excluded for reasons stated below.  
The criteria typically used to judge regression equations readily accept the results in 
Table 1: 
 The intercept and the estimated coefficient of each of the independent 
variables have the expected signs. 
 Their magnitudes are reasonable.8  
 The intercept and the estimated coefficients of the independent variables are 
highly significant. 
 The estimated equation as a whole is highly significant.  
 The proportion of the variation in sample PAUC growth captured by the 
estimated equation is towards the upper end of what can be expected for 
panel data. 
                                            
 
 
8 Evaluations of the reasonableness of the estimated coefficients of the acquisition policy periods 
must weigh the Climate effect by the proportion of the acquisition policy period spent in a boom 
climate. This was, for example, zero for AR and 0.154 (=2/13) for DSARC. 
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In addition, the overall features of the results are consistent with what would be 
expected from the history of OSD-level oversight of MDAPs over the relevant period (FY 
1965–FY 2009).9  
Four important conclusions are implied by the estimates in Table 1: 
 The highly significant negative coefficient of Climate implies that the average 
PAUC growth of programs that passed MS B in a boom climate was 
significantly less than that of programs that passed in a bust climate. 
 The 1969 Packard reforms of the acquisition process (which define the 
DSARC bin) resulted in a significant reduction in average PAUC growth 
compared to that of the preceding McNamara-Clifford period. 
 The other three acquisition policy configurations (P-C DSARC, DAB, and AR) 
also had average PAUC growth significantly lower than that of McNamara-
Clifford. 
 Average PAUC growth in the four post-McNamara-Clifford acquisition policy 
bins did not differ significantly from one another.10  
In brief—funding climate has the expected association with PAUC growth, the 1969 
Packard reforms reduced average PAUC growth, and the reduction persisted through the 
end of the study period (FY 2009), but changes to the acquisition process after the Packard 
reforms through FY 2009 were not associated with further reductions in average PAUC 
growth. 
The regression in Table 1 contains a remarkable feature. Ordinarily, when outliers (of 
the dependent variable) are removed from the dataset, the test statistics of the regression 
improve. This is not the case for the baseline model. If PAUC and duration outliers and 
programs procured with TPP are removed from the dataset, three of the four estimated 
coefficients of acquisition policy bins (including that for DSARC) are not statistically different 
from zero. The point is that the results are driven by the extreme values of PAUC growth. 
That is to say, the 1969 Packard reforms were effective because they reduced the 
frequency of MDAPs with extremely high PAUC growth.  
Table 2 provides data that can be used to directly test this interpretation. The striking 
feature of these data is the paucity of outliers after the introduction of the Packard reforms in 
1969. The PAUC growth of three of the 16 programs of the McNamara-Clifford years was 
large enough (at least 134%) to qualify as an outlier11; of the 94 MDAPs that passed MS B 
during the other four periods, only two had PAUC growth of at least 134%. This difference is 
                                            
 
 
9 See McNicol (2018), Chapter 5. 
10 This statement rests on the results of Wald’s test with the Bonferroni correction. Wald’s test, as 
used here, tests whether, considered jointly, any of a1, a2, a3, and a4 are significantly different from the 
others. The Bonferroni correction effectively increases the critical value used to judge statistical 
significance to recognize that in multiple comparisons there is a considerable probability of a 
significant difference arising by chance even if the underlying population values are identical. 
11 We use the word outlier here as defined by John Tukey: observations 1.5 times the Inter Quartile 
Range above the third quartile or below the first quartile. None of the outliers had exceptionally low 
PAUC growth. 
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statistically significant.12 Similar differences were not found for PAUC growth of at least 50% 
and at least 100%.13 It appears then that the Packard reforms worked mainly by reducing 
the frequency of very high cost growth programs rather than by reducing cost growth on 
programs generally. 
Table 2. Average PAUC Growth by Acquisition Policy Configuration and the 
Number of High Cost Growth MDAPs in Each Cohort, Bust Funding 
Climates for Completed Programs 
 
Model 2—The Basic Model Plus Boom Effects 
Model 2 is prompted by the conjecture that boom climates facilitate PAUC growth of 
ongoing programs that enter them. If this is so, average PAUC growth presumably will be 
higher for MDAPs that entered a boom climate sometime after passing MS B than it will for 
those that did not. This would in particular be expected of programs that passed MS B in a 
bust climate, but it might also be true of programs that passed in a boom climate.  
A two-part naming convention is used to label programs that encountered a boom 
climate post-MS B and those that did not. The first part of the label gives the funding climate 
prevailing when the program passed MS B—bust or boom. The second part—0, 1, or 2—
denotes the number of boom climates the program entered post-MS B. Programs that 
passed MS B in a bust climate and were completed entirely within that bust climate will be 
referred to as Bust0—Bust because they passed MS B in a bust funding climate and zero 
because they were completed without entering a boom climate. Programs that passed MS B 
in a bust period and continued into a subsequent boom period make up Bust1 or, for the few 
programs that extended into two boom periods, Bust2. Programs that passed MS B in boom 
climates are, similarly, denoted Boom0 or Boom1. (There are no programs in Boom2 as of 
this writing because programs that passed MS B during the Carter-Reagan boom climate 
had only one subsequent boom climate they could enter, the post 9/11 boom.)  
These definitions capture just one feature of the post-MS B funding climates 
experienced by programs. They exclude other features that possibly are relevant. For 
example, they do not take into account the time spent in different funding climates or 
                                            
 
 
12 Fisher’s Exact Test (FET); p = 0.021. Application of FET to the five bins of the 134% column of 
Table 2 yields p = 0.016. 
13 FET; p = 0.297 and p = 0.271 for 50% and 100%, respectively. 
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transitions from boom to bust of programs that passed MS B in boom periods. These simple 
definitions do nonetheless provide a way to examine whether boom effects are visible in the 
data. 
We start with average PAUC growth for Bust0, Bust1, and Bust2 presented in Table 
3 for the post-McNamara-Clifford portion of the first bust-boom cycle period14 and the entire 
bust portion of the second cycle. Recall that only data for completed programs are used. In 
both periods, average PAUC growth for the treatment group (Bust1) is higher than it is for 
the control group (Bust0)—42% compared to 18% for the first period and 44% compared to 
12% for the second. These differences are statistically significant.15 For programs that 
passed MS B in a bust period, subsequent entry into a boom period is then associated with 
higher PAUC growth. PAUC growth for Bust2 is higher than that of Bust0 but less than that 
of Bust1.16 Average PAUC growth for Bust2, however, is not significantly different from that 
for either Bust0 or Bust1.  
Table 3. Average PAUC Growth by the Number of Boom Periods Experienced for 
Completed MDAPs That Passed MS B in Post–McNamara-Clifford Bust 
Climates 
 
The next step is to include boom effects in the baseline model. We define two 
variables, CboomBust and CboomBoom. CboomBust is 1 for all programs in Bust1 and Bust2; 
these programs passed MS B in a bust and then experienced one or two boom periods 
post-MS B. For all other programs, CboomBust is zero. Similarly, CboomBoom is 1 for programs 
in Boom1 and zero for all other programs; these programs passed MS B in the Carter-
Reagan boom and then experienced the 9/11 boom period post-MS B. The results are 
presented in Table 4.  
                                            
 
 
14 Average PAUC growth for Bust0 programs is 87% and that for Bust1 is 34%. The anomaly here is 
not the average PAUC growth for Bust1—which is in line with the averages for the other bust 
periods—but the exceptionally high cost growth of Bust0. 
15 Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) and Anderson-Darling (A-D) find the PAUC growth data in each of the 
three bins of the first bust period to be consistent with a normal distribution. An F-test found the 
variances for Bust0 and Bust1to be significantly different. A two-tailed t-test assuming unequal 
sample variances found the means of Bust1 and Bust0 for the first period to be significantly different 
(p = 0.003). K-S finds the distribution of PAUC growth for Bust1 of the second bust period to be non-
normal. The means of Bust0 and Bust 1 for the second bust period are significantly different by the 
Man-Whitney U test: p = 0.018, U = 97.5, n1 = 35, n2 = 10. 
16 The programs in Bust2 are the CVN 68, with a PAUC growth of 7%; the NAVSTAR GPS (85%); 
ATCCS-MCS (-34%); and the UH-60A (54%). A two-tailed t-test, with unequal variances as 
appropriate, found the mean of Bust2 not to be significantly different from that of Bust0 (p = 0.732) or 
Bust1 (p = 0.440). 
- 97 - 
Table 4. Estimated Coefficients and p-Values for a Model That Includes the 
Effects of Climate at MS B and Post-MS B 
 
Three MDAPs in Boom1 were acquired using a TPP contract. These three programs 
have much higher PAUC growth than Boom0 programs—because they were acquired using 
a TPP contract, not because they passed into a boom period post-MS B. For that reason, 
they are dropped from the sample.17  
The estimated coefficient of CboomBust (18.0%) is marginally significant. We do, then, 
see evidence of a boom effect. The estimated coefficient of CboomBoom (8.8%) is smaller 
and not significant. As with the previous model, estimates imply that the Packard reforms of 
1969 resulted in a decrease in PAUC growth; that decrease persisted, but subsequent 
changes in acquisition policy apparently did not result in further significant decreases in 
PAUC growth. 
Model 3—Program Duration 
The longer a program’s duration, the greater its chance of moving into a boom 
funding climate. For that reason alone, longer duration presumably is associated with higher 
PAUC growth.  
Figure 1 provides some evidence on the premise of the discussion. It plots the 
average PAUC growth for the bust and boom bins along with the corresponding average 
program duration (defined as the number of years from MS B through the end of the 
                                            
 
 
17 See McNicol (2018) Chapter 3, Section B. 
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acquisition phase).18 The prefixes 1st and 2nd indicate the bust-boom cycle—FY 1965–FY 
1986 (1st)19 and FY 1987–FY 2009 (2nd). Programs that passed MS B in bust climates 
added more PAUC per year of duration than did programs that passed MS B in a boom 
climate. 
 
Figure 1. Average PAUC Growth and Average Program Duration for Boom and 
Bust Periods 
A plausible approach to separating the boom effect from a duration effect is to enter 
into the model a variable defined as the number of years spent in boom climates (Tboom) and 
another variable that is the number of years spent in bust climates (Tbust). Very simple 
definitions of Tboom and Tbust were adopted:  
 Tboom = number of years in boom climates post-MS B 
 Tbust = number of years in bust climates post-MS B 
Note that this definition counts a year during which the program was in Engineering 
and Manufacturing Development the same as a year in which the program was in Low Rate 
Initial Production (LRIP) or full rate production. There are several alternatives to this 
definition. For example, the duration variables might be defined as the years in boom and 
bust climates, respectively, after the program enters LRIP. 
Setting aside for the moment the categorical variables for the acquisition policy 
configurations, the core model considered is shown in Equation 2: 
PAUCi = a + bClimate + cTboom,i + dTbust,i + vi.    (2) 
                                            
 
 
18 The end of the acquisition phase was defined as the final year in which substantial procurement 
funding was obligated, as reported in the program’s final SAR. 
19 The McNamara-Clifford period was excluded from the first cycle. See footnote 14 
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where vi is the error term. Note that c and d are measured in units of percentage points per 
year; they are the rates at which programs’ PAUC growth increases per year in boom and 
bust climates, respectively.   
We expect the estimated coefficient of Climate to be negative, implying that 
programs that passed MS B in boom climates have lower PAUC growth than those that 
passed in bust climates. This specification also allows for climate effects in that the 
estimates of c and d may be different. In particular, we would expect the estimate of c to be 
larger than that of d—that is, that PAUC growth accumulates more rapidly in boom than in 
bust years. Estimates of the parameters of this model expanded to include the categorical 
variables for the acquisition policy configurations are presented in Table 5.  
Table 5. Estimated Coefficients and p-Values for a Model That Includes the 
Effects of Post-MS B Funding Climate and Duration 
 
All of the estimated coefficients have the expected signs, and all except that for Tbust 
are statistically significant. Like the estimates for Models 1 and 2, the estimates for Model 3 
imply that the Packard reforms of 1969 resulted in a decrease in PAUC growth; that 
decrease persisted, but subsequent changes in acquisition policy apparently did not result in 
further significant decreases in PAUC growth. The new result provided by Model 3 is that 
PAUC growth on average increases by 4.2 percentage points (the estimated coefficient of 
Tboom) for each year spent in a boom climate. Note that Model 3 assumes that the effect on 
PAUC growth of a boom year is the same for programs that passed MS B in boom climates 
as it is for those that passed in bust climates, which probably is not the case. 
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Model 4—Alternative Representation of Climate Effects 
There is a way to overcome this limitation of Model 3. The alternative uses what are 
called slope categorical variables, one for boom years (Tboom*Climate) and one for bust 
years (Tbust*Climate). In this approach, climate effects are captured in the estimated 
coefficients of Tboom, Tbust, and the slope categorical variables. As is illustrated later, 
introduction of these variables allows the regression to pick different rates of cost 
accumulation for MDAPs that passed MS B in boom climates than for those that passed in 
bust climates. We expect that MDAPs that passed MS B in boom years accumulate less 
PAUC growth in both bust and boom years than MDAPs that passed MS B in bust years. 
The estimated coefficients for Tboom*Climate and Tbust*Climate are then expected to be 
negative.  
Table 6 presents the estimated coefficients and p-values for this alternative. Once 
again, the estimates imply that the Packard reforms of 1969 resulted in a decrease in PAUC 
growth; that decrease persisted, but subsequent changes in acquisition policy apparently did 
not result in further significant decreases in PAUC growth. These estimates, however, shed 
considerable light on why programs that passed MS B in bust climates on average had 
higher cost growth than those that passed in boom climates. To see how requires being 
clear about the estimated rates at which programs accumulated cost growth over time. 
The estimated coefficient of Tboom (4.8%/yr) is the rate at which a program that 
passed MS B in a bust climate accumulates cost in boom years. The rate for programs that 
passed MS B in boom climates is much lower, and in fact, negative: -0.1%/yr. This is the 
sum of the estimated coefficient for Tboom and the coefficient for Tboom*Climate (4.8%/yr –
4.9%/yr = -0.1%/yr). The uncertainties in the estimates are such, however, that the 
estimated rate could about as easily be 0.1%/yr as  0.1%/yr.20 The point here is that 
programs that passed MS B in bust climates evidentially accumulate PAUC growth much 
more rapidly when they encounter a boom period than do programs that passed MS B in a 
boom climate.  
                                            
 
 
20 The negative estimates are not unreasonable a priori. Some programs that pass MS B in a boom 
climate may be used as “banks”—that is, relatively safe places to hold out-year claims on funding. A 
program used as a bank will show negative quantity normalized PAUC growth when “withdrawals” are 
made. It may be relevant in this regard that about one-third of the programs that passed MS B in 
boom climates show negative PAUC growth. 
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Table 6. Estimated Coefficients and p-Values for a Model That Includes the 
Effects of Post-MS B Funding Climate and Duration 
 
Programs that passed MS B in a bust climate accumulate cost in subsequent bust 
years at an estimated rate of 1.2 percentage points per year. This estimate is not statistically 
significant. The corresponding rate for programs that passed MS B in a boom climate is - 
0.6%/yr (= 1.2%/yr – 1.8%/yr). The estimated coefficients for Tbust and Tbust*Climate also are 
not statistically significant. The estimates, then, do not say much about the rate at which 
PAUC growth accumulates in bust years. 
Cost Growth Due to Program Changes 
The duration variables of Model 4 direct attention to the question of the extent to 
which cost growth of programs that passed MS B in bust climates is due mainly to unrealistic 
MS B baselines. At one extreme, most programs that pass MS B may have unrealistic MS B 
baselines and use entry into a boom period as a chance to “get well.” At the other extreme, 
the tendency in bust periods may be to approve austere programs. When these programs 
enter a boom climate, they are expanded to acquire capabilities beyond those in their MS B 
baseline, which is to say that PAUC growth may be largely a matter of program changes.  
Selected Acquisition Report: Global Broadcast System (DoD, 2003) provides an 
example of a program whose content was increased early in the post-9/11 boom. (It passed 
MS B early in FY 1998 and is accordingly a Bust1 program. GBS was ongoing at the end of 
FY 2016.) According to the report, 
The current GBS architecture is based on Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
(ATM) technology. … In December 2002, DoD directed GBS’s migration to a 
more sustainable commercial and standards-based open architecture, based 
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upon the Internet Protocol (IP). Also, the GBS program received FY03 Iraqi 
Freedom Funds (IFF) supplemental funding for IP Acceleration of production 
units to replace deployed ATM units. Based upon extensive warfighter inputs, 
the accelerated IP production effort included design and development of a 
new, single case version of the Receive Suite (88XR) for the Army, Navy, and 
Marine Corps. 
Space Based Infrared Satellite-High (SBIRS-High), like GBS, is a Bust1 program. It 
passed MS B early in FY 1997. As of the December 2015 SARs, funding for the Baseline 
SBIRS-High program was expected to end in FY 2018. SBIRS-High is a useful contrast to 
GBS. A large portion of the growth in SBIRS-High unit procurement cost for the baseline 
program—roughly one-third—occurred before FY 2003, while most of the other two-thirds 
occurred during FY 2003–FY 2009. This increase was not driven by increased capability, 
however, but by the unrealistic cost estimate in the MS B SBIRS-High baseline (See Porter 
et al., 2009; Younossi et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2015).  
In the GBS example, it seems clear that capabilities beyond those in the MS B 
baseline were added to the program. While unit cost did increase, that was a matter of 
paying more for more. For SBIRS-High, in contrast, it appears that the advent of a boom 
funding climate provided a program experiencing severe problems an opportunity to “get 
well.” In effect, what otherwise would have been capability shortfalls were converted into 
cost growth and, relative to MS B, the DoD eventually paid more for the MS B SBIRS-High 
capability than had been anticipated.  
As these examples indicate, the boom effect in general results from acquisition of 
capability beyond that in the MS B baseline and unrealistic assumptions in the MS B 
baseline. In examples, the PAUC growth associated with the boom climate mainly appeared 
in the SARs for the boom years. While we have no examples to offer, PAUC growth for 
Bust1 and Boom1 programs also occurs between MS B and the subsequent boom. Again, 
this growth can reflect either acquisition of capability beyond the MS B level or recognition 
that the cost of acquiring the MS B capability is higher than anticipated. 
During a period of nearly 20 years starting in 1989, the Office of Program Analysis 
and Evaluation (PA&E), predecessor of the Office of Cost Assessment and Program 
Evaluation (CAPE), funded development of a database that separated cost growth due to 
program changes21 from cost growth due to what PA&E called “mistakes.”22 The data in 
Table 7 are drawn from the version of the PA&E database updated through the December 
2002 SARs.23   
                                            
 
 
21 A major difficulty in separating program changes from Errors of Inception is ambiguity in statements 
of capabilities to be acquired. Those responsible for compiling the PA&E database were well aware of 
this problem. 
22 In about 2010, the Office of Program Assessments and Root Cause Analyses (PARCA) defined 
top-level proximate causes of cost growth. These included both Errors of Inception and Errors of 
Execution. As defined earlier by PA&E, the “mistakes” category is the sum of Errors of Inception and 
Errors of Execution. See McCrillis (2003). 
23 This is the database used in McNicol (2004). 
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Table 7. PAUC Growth Due to Errors and Program Changes 
 
In the boom climate FY 1981–FY 1986, program changes were almost 80% of the 
total PAUC growth. In the bust periods, however, PAUC growth due to program changes 
was about one-third of the total. These data imply that the higher PAUC growth of programs 
that passed MS B in bust climates is primarily due to errors.  
This analysis can be carried forward another step. The most interesting number in 
Table 7 for this purpose is the 4% for errors in the boom period FY 1981–FY 1986. This 
number is the sum of Errors of Inception and Errors of Execution. It is reasonable to 
assume, however, that Errors of Inception are on average small for programs that passed 
MS B in a boom period. Pushing that assumption to its limit, we have an estimate for Errors 
of Execution for the programs for the first boom period of 4%. Unfortunately, comparable 
data for the second boom period (FY 2003–FY 2009) are not available, so we have no 
check on how representative this estimate is; it is the only estimate we have of the average 
Errors of Execution for a substantial number of programs. If it is accepted as representative, 
the data in Table 7 imply that the average PAUC growth of MDAPs that passed MS B in 
bust climates due to unrealistic MS B baselines is about 17% to 20%. 
Conclusion 
Each of the models yielded the same pattern of results:  
 MDAPs that passed MS B in a bust climate on average had significantly 
higher PAUC growth than those that passed MS B in a boom climate;  
 The 1969 Packard reforms reduced average PAUC growth;  
 The reduction persisted through the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s;  
 Changes to the acquisition process after the 1969 Packard reforms are not 
associated with further reductions in average PAUC growth.  
Incorporation of the boom effect and program duration in the models does not 
provide further policy insights. These factors were significant, however, and must be 
considered in future analyses of MDAP cost growth. 
The PA&E data on PAUC growth due to program changes suggest that the lower 
PAUC growth after the Packard reforms probably was due mainly to adoption of more 
realistic MS B baseline lines. We also find in those data an indication that cost growth baked 
into the MS B baselines—that is, Errors of Inception—are several times larger than Errors of 
Execution. That conclusion, however, amounts to less than it might seem to at first glance. 
The classic Error of Inception occurs when the DoD contracts for a Lincoln and budgets for 
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a Ford. Eventually, additional funding must be added to the budget to buy the Lincoln. The 
DoD must make the necessary budgetary adjustments within a given top line—usually within 
funding for acquisitions. These adjustments include such measures as stretches, delays, 
cancellations, and descoping of programs. It is the cost increase imposed by these 
adjustments, rather than the difference between the cost of a Lincoln and a Ford, that is the 
relevant cost of Errors of Inception.24 
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